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Abstract
This senior thesis is an in depth analysis of the historical causes of the Syrian civil
war. I argue that the main components leading to the civil war under Bashar al-Asad were
as follows; Sectarian division, French intervention and mandates, Israeli & Syrian conflict,
Egypt & Syrian Union, and Hafiz al-Asad’s rise to power. My research and analysis provided
demonstrates that these previously mentioned historical stimuli have all amalgamated
leading to the instability under Bashar al-Asad and ultimately the modern civil war we see
today. The paper will also analyze the consequences of this instability seen in government
and society, the source of the brutal civil war. These consequences include a look at
Lebanon as a case study, the economy both domestically in Syria and internationally,
demographic changes, and a focus on refugee movements seen today. It concludes with the
establishment that the civil war is the result of not just one individual event, as is often
argued internationally, but rather a conglomerate of deeply intertwined historical
moments.
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I.

OPENING
The Middle East often brings to one’s mind thoughts of turmoil, instability, strife, and

overall chaos. A region of the world plagued by civil and international wars, it has
experienced increased dissention among citizens, failing governments, and growth in
terrorist strongholds. What was once seen as a problem for a few, has grown to be a
problem for many. Many outside forces, including the United States, felt intervention could
aid and alleviate the situation. Intervention in the Middle East though, has now come at a
hefty price. With the United States, and many other effected countries, facing domestic
debate concerning the issues at hand in the Middle East and how to proceed, they are too
far in to leave but are constantly risking the lives of their own people. Many argue the
United States should have never invaded Iraq in 2003, and that this was the start of
international players meddling with foreign affairs in this region. While this can be debated
for years to come, one thing is much more clear. Not only with the United States, but all
international powers who play a prominent role in international relations, the lack of
understanding the deeply rooted history of these countries is where they have gone direly
wrong. I aim with this paper to prove that international belief in one specified event as the
cause of the civil war does not bring us closer to a solution for Syria.
To even begin to make a positive change and democratize a region of the world so
different from western culture, one must analyze where it has been and how it got to where
it currently is. The Middle East is complexly intertwined, with vehemently devoted persons
of both religion and ethnicity. The historical events between these multitudes of various
sects, dates significantly farther back than most other countries’ existence, especially the
United States, the fundamental outside component we see today. While each country has a
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different story to tell, it is Syria that has stolen the modern spotlight and debate floor. Syria,
a country many felt to be stable and secure under the Asad Regime has come toppling
down in the past five years by a raging civil war. This civil war, full of violent acts against
humanity and civil rights, has led to a mass exodus of Syrian peoples. Seeking refuge
wherever will accept them; the refugee crisis has become a new focal point for political
debate concerning the Middle East. Terrorist groups have seen the Syrian civil war and
resulting refugee movements as an opportunity to impose harm on their target countries
through infiltration into different countries posed as a refugee. Of course there are many
terrible side effects of the Syrian civil war, however this paper will focus on the most tragic
consequence; refugee movements. To understand how Syria has arrived at this cataclysmic
point, one must first analyze and understand the history of the country. The historical
events that will be analyzed include the sectarian divides, French imperialism and
mandates, the Israeli & Syrian conflict, the union between Egypt & Syria, Hafiz al-Asad’s
rise to power, and the current rule of Bashar al-Asad. This paper will analyze the history of
the Syrian civil war in a way that supports a multifaceted view of its historical causes. It
will also examine the modern tragic consequences broadly that we are experiencing today,
and then specifically the resulting refugee movement. It concludes with the establishment
that the civil war is the result of not just one individual event, as is often argued
internationally, but rather a conglomerate of deeply intertwined historical moments.

II. HISTORY
There must be an understanding of the main historical moments that have
contributed to the Syrian failure. As Syrian expert Josef Olmert stated, “its fundamental
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causes, as well as its course and possible implications are uniquely bound with the political
development of the Syrian state from its very inception” (SPME). Understanding Syria
begins with an analysis of how The Middle East even came into existence. Before it was, as
it is today, modernly known as “The Middle East”, it was historically referred to as “the
Near East”. The extensive historical background of such a region is what plays such a
deeply prominent role in where it is at today. No other region or country has the depth of
history quite like the Middle East; after all, one author describes it as “the most ancient
region of human civilization” (Mansfield). To understand the causes of the modern civil war
in Syria, including the French rule and mandate, the war with Israel, the various sects and
ethnic groups, the Ba’ath party, and the Assad Regime, one must first understand how they
all came about. With that, let us start from the beginning.
Syria today is marked by its diverse ethnic and religious groups. Having such a
variety of peoples, with the smallest differences, plays not only into its rich culture, but its
undertone for violence. Even from the start Syria was recognized as an eccentric
population having a mixture of peoples and culture. One of the first recognized groups to
dominate Syria for a thousand years from 3500 B.C. were the non-Semitic and highly
civilized Sumerians from Mesopotamia (Mansfield). Then came the Semitic Amorites,
nomads from central Arabia, who defeated the Sumerians. After that, the Babylonians in the
middle of the third millennium who were followed by the Egyptians. The Egyptians
however, were driven out throughout history by different invaders including the Hittites’
who completely conquered all of Syria in 1450 B.C. (Mansfield). As these groups began to
settle and make Syria and Palestine their home, they became known as a collective whole
called the Canaanites in 1600 B.C. This group was unique because although they were
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known by one name, they were made up of many different people from many different
places. Next, in 1200 B.C. the Armaeans gained control of Damascus. As time passed on,
control of Syria changed hands often. Through it all though, the Canaanites avoided
violence and battle by getting along with their conquerors and making civilization between
the two possible.
As Alexander the Great came to The Middle East and began conquering cities and
states, Syria fell into the hands of Seleucus. Seleucus was a Persian ruler and friend of
Alexander’s, whom eventually founded the capital city of Syria, Antioch. As Rome became a
dominant force in the Middle East, Greek rivals Seleucid and Ptolemaic sent Syria into a
decline. This decline was played out through the local powers in Syria who saw the battle
and weakness as a chance to assert themselves and claim what they wanted. This created
more tension and hostile feelings than were already once present. Eventually, from 29 B.C.
to A.D. 14 the entire Middle East region was incorporated into the Roman Empire. From
this point on for a while, Syria and several other countries experienced peace and order
through Roman law. The Romans were a rather fair conqueror with much of Syria, allowing
locations to remain autonomous so long as they didn’t threaten any sort of instability in the
Roman rule. As we will later see amongst the minorities and Sunni in Syria, even
historically the urban population was more educated and part of the intellectual elite, while
the rural population tended to be those of the lower socioeconomic classes constituting
peasants and tribesman.
Later controlled by the Byzantines, a small group of Islamic faith followers set their
sites on regaining Syria and Egypt, which they succeeded by unifying through their
resentment towards imperial powers. Upon conquering Syria, the death of the prophet, and
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the assassination of the Caliph successor, the first cousin of the Prophet was to be the
successor. However, Ali was defeated by the Umayyads, which led to the first and only
great division in Islam: between the Sunnis, or ‘people of the sunnah’, who are the great
majority, and the Shia or ‘partisans’ of Ali (Mansfield). This has had a major affect on the
modern region we see today as each country is dominated or has a majority group of
typically either Sunni or Shiite causing great dissention and turmoil.
Syria from the beginning has had a civilization marked by numerous changes of
power. The instant a weakness is shown by the group or person in charge, or the moment
more than one group find synonymous ground to go up against the authority, is when a
change in power and confrontation occurs. As hostile feelings towards imperial outside
forces became a unifying force against the Byzantine people, it would also become a factor
in Syrian interaction with the French. As the collapse of the Ottoman Empire came to the
forefront, Britain and France took it upon themselves to do what they wanted in the Middle
East.

III. SECTARIAN DIVISIONS
Understanding Syrian history should be like building blocks. To begin, there must be
an understanding of the various religious and ethnic groups that have emerged over the
years. This is a key factor to basic understanding because, “despite a great measure of
cultural uniformity, Syria’s present population is characterized by strong religious and
ethnic diversity” (Van Dam). Some of this diversity stems from the religious minorities,
which are the Alawis (11.5%), Druzes (3.0%), Isma’ilis (1.5%), and the Greek Orthodox
Christians (4.7%), who constitute the most important community of all Christians in Syria
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(14.1%) (Van Dam). The other side of diversity stems from the ethnic branch of minorities.
These principle minorities are the Kurds (8.5%), Armenians (4.0%), Turcomans (3.0%),
and Circassians (Van Dam). A portion of the minorities belong to the Sunni Muslim
population, allowing them to identify to some extent with a majority of the population
while others find themselves falling in the minority category in both religion and ethnicity.
It is thus evident that Syria is filled with an array of religious and ethnic variations
contributing to their diversity, and their turmoil. Author Nikolaos Van Dam, a specialist on
Syria, attributes the existence of so many religious and ethnic groups in Syria to seven main
factors. The first factor is, “The three major monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity
and Islam, all have their origins in the wider region of which Syria is part. The Formation of
sects and different schools within these religions led to a great diversity of faiths” (Van
Dam). In other words, the Middle East is the source of the three main umbrella religions:
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The smaller branches of each of these religious groups that
have formed over the years of history, each have diverted from the main train of thought in
their own right. With slight variations in beliefs and worship, the factions have created an
assortment of new religious faiths and practices all at play around the world, and more
importantly in Syria.
The second influential factor that Van Dam points out is, “The Fertile Crescent, of
which Syria is part, has in the past regularly been exposed to conquest by various
population groups, such as the Arabs, Kurds, Mongols and Turks, and has always been a
centre of tribal and individual movement” (Van Dam). The Fertile Crescent is a name given
to a crescent shaped area of the Middle East region that was made up of Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and northern Egypt. This same region has also been nicknamed
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“The Cradle of Civilization”. This region can be deemed an area typical of conquest due to
its prime conditions for agricultural prosperity including the fertility of the land. An
example of historical evidence proving the attempt to conquer this area by different
population groups is seen during the time of the Ottoman rule from 1708-1758, when “the
province of Damascus was caught in a vise between displaced Arab, Turkman, and Kurdish
tribes as well as the great movement of Arab tribes from the south, all threatening the
whole of the Fertile Crescent” (Barbir).
The third factor is that, “At times the Middle East has been a place of refuge for
people who were persecuted in surrounding regions on political or religious grounds.
Groups of these refugees were able to settle in Syria or its surroundings” (Van Dam). The
next factor was, “Tribal and national differences caused by all these developments often
took on a religious aspect and contributed to the rise of different religious communities. It
is only natural that political and religious diversities developed simultaneously as part of
this process” (Van Dam). The rise of different religious communities was the source of the
now pluralistic culture and society apparent in Syria. Religious pluralism is often defined as
the diversity of religious belief systems co-existing in society. Religious affiliations are
strong in the sense that people choose based on which truths they believe to be correct. In
this thought process it leaves no room for acceptance of truly varying opinions. Religious
sects offer their own exclusive claims, so to speak. As the Syrian society became a
conglomerate of persecuted people from outside their borders, this cultivated the rise of
differing opinions, which ultimately crossed over into the political realm. The fifth factor
was that, “Religious, tribal and linguistic differences have frequently been preserved and
strengthened as a result of localism, an intense local loyalty which in certain regions was
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fostered by the geographical structure. This was particularly true of the mountains and
valleys of the Latakia region, and of the Jabal al-Duruz, with its difficult access” (Van Dam).
The next factor was the role of deficient communications in areas of difficult access
and the lack of a strong central authority which have both helped to preserve the
distinctive character and independence of religious and national groups (Van Dam). In
other words if a specific group wished to remain out of state and government control they
were able to secure seclusion in order to be undisturbed. As a result, the areas that the
government did and could extend control over tended to be inhabited by the dominant
religious and national groups. In the case of Syria, this was the Sunni Arabs. In their best
effort to avoid subjection the minorities, Alawis, Druzes, and Isma’ilis, historic decision to
seclude themselves, has since left their population’s fate sealed in the less accessible
regions. The final factor is that, “religious and ethnic diversities were also encouraged by
the toleration shown by Islam towards Christians and Jews as well as the formal equality of
national groups inside Islam. Ultimately, far reaching assimilation took place” (Van Dam).
In conclusion, not only were differing religious and ethnic minority groups spreading like
wildfire in Syria, they were spreading in a society that was doing nothing to stop it at the
time. This partial acceptance, or toleration, can be attributed to the lack of emphasis on
nationalism at the time, which would later grow exponentially causing great rifts among
the growing diversity.
The Alawis, Druzes, and Isma’ilis, which all make up the “compact religious
minorities” must be discussed based on their strong political role in Syrian history. As was
mentioned previously, many of the minority ethnic and religious groups sought out
seclusion to abstain from the rule of law of the government. This caused the Alawis to find
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themselves particularly concentrated in the Latakia region where they constitute a local
majority of about 75% of all Syrian Alawis (Van Dam). While making up a majority in
Latakia’s rural population they constituted a minority in the urban coastal cities. As a
result, rural-urban and class contrasts more often than not coincided with sectarian
differences (Van Dam). Furthermore the urban population, primarily made up of Sunnis,
became increasingly dominant and controlling over the rural population, primarily made
up of Alawis. Beaten down and poverty-stricken, distrust and anger towards Sunnis by the
Alawis grew strong.
The Alawis are typically subdivided into four main confederations. These
confederations are their tribal affiliations. The four main confederations are: the
Khayyatun, Haddadun, Matawirah and Kalbiya (Van Dam). Perpetuating the deeply diverse
culture of Syria, “of the four Alawi tribal confederations two important religious groups
have split off; the Haydariyun and the Ghasasinah” (Van Dam). The Haydariyun who have
their own religious differentiating unity continued to uphold their tribal ties. The
Ghasasinah came to the forefront following the First World War under the leadership of
Sulayman al-Murhsid. Upon his death, most of his followers re-associated and reconnected
ties to their former tribes. Villages and land in the Middle East, specifically Syria, are split
up and owned amongst the eclectic families of various tribes. These tribes were further
subdivided and each subdivision had its own foreman or “muqaddam” (Van Dam). Alawi
tribes also had their own religious leader who was expected to perform the same duties
with less power. In many cases though, the religious leaders were so influential that they
were able to compete with the tribal leader for power and leadership within a tribe. Due to
the land being split up according to family ties, most often the tribes of these lands were
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acquired through inheritance. However, there were select instances where an individual
became a tribal leader based not on family connections but by personal qualities or
influence in Syrian power institutions at a national level (Van Dam). The latter
circumstance of gaining tribal leadership allowed the opportunity for a few poor Alawi
families to be placed in powerful positions (Van Dam). One essential example of this is
President Hafiz al-Asad. This family ultimately became the powerhouse regime that has led
the outbreak of civil war in Syria.
The “Alawi Mountains” as they were called, were so remote and underdeveloped
that the low socio-economic status of the Alawis was taken advantage of by the Sunnis
through inadequate pay for tobacco sales. Relations between the two groups were sewn
with contempt and resentment, especially as poor Alawi families began selling their
daughters as house servants for urban Sunnis (Van Dam). However, since the rise to power
of the Asad regime and Ba’th party in 1963, circumstances for Alawi peasants have greatly
improved. Education was highly sought after for the Alawi people. They were able to attain
higher education and more weighty degrees by their now powerful co-religionist Ba’th
party. Raising their status as doctors, lawyers, engineers and university professors, “by the
1990s the Alawi people were rivaling and sometimes displacing the Sunni and Christian
intelligentsia” (Van Dam). Syria experienced a transfer of power and was now under Alawi
dominated Ba’thist rule (Van Dam). Over time many of the previously considered Sunni
coastal cities had become majority Alawi through what became known as “Alawisation”
(Van Dam). This trend also became apparent in the suburbs of a major city in Syria,
Damascus.
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The Syrian Druzes, like the Alawis, experienced seclusion and high concentration,
but in al-Suwayda. Their percent concentration is far greater in al-Suwayda than the Alawis
in the Latakia region. The Druzes in the al-Suwayda region have ancestral roots in Lebanon,
Palestine and the Aleppo region. In this region the people are evenly distributed with the
urban and rural areas both consisting of primarily Druze peoples. As a result of this, a
differing point between the two regions that must be addressed is, unlike in the Latakia
region where the traditional elite is a mixture of Alawi, Christians, and Sunni; the
traditional elite in al-Suwayda is entirely Druze (Van Dam). These two regions and their
populations are a crucial component to understanding internal Syrian relations, something
very central to the civil war. The homogeneous population in al-Suwayda contributes to its
overall stronger regional identification and therefore social cohesion than is present in
Latakia where intra-regional tensions are greater (Van Dam). Therefore, “Religious-tribalfeudal relations, such as those existing within the Alawi community, have not occurred
among the Druzes” (Van Dam). When the Druze migrated from Lebanon, Palestine, and
Aleppo, they were able to dominate and lead in the al-Suwayda region for one of two
reasons; either “they numerically were a majority or because villages were composed
almost entirely of members of one extended family” (Van Dam). The Druzes of this region
have been marked by their strength to show relatively consistent unity. When the central
Ottoman government or the Syrian government in Damascus attempted to extend their
authority over the Druze, they resisted and remained undivided. Syria is a country whose
history is full of division, division in religion, ethnicity, regional territory, politics, and
more. One can begin to see how easily and even likely dissention among the various groups
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is, especially in a region of the world that culturally holds so dearly and recognizes so
firmly these differences.
The province of Hama is the major center for the minority group Isma’ilis. More
specifically they are located primarily in the districts of Masyaf and Salamiyah. In the
eleventh century most Isma’ilis fled to the mountains of the Latakia region. At this time
they began to settle in the towns of Masyaf and Qadmus. The division of the Latakia region
between the Isma’ilis and the Alawis was not with good spirit. The Alawis tended to be
hostile towards the Isma’ilis who eventually migrated back to Salamiyah “after the Ottoman
Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II granted them part of the Empire’s domain there in 1845” (Van
Dam). The Isma’ilis located in the Alawi mountains have remained poor over time while
those who returned to Salamiyah advanced economically and socially (Van Dam). This
contrast can be attributed to the suppression and domination by the majority Alawi
population in the Latakia region over the minority group of Isma’ilis. Whereas in Salamiyah
the Isma’ilis are more concentrated, constituting a majority, as well as protected by the
Ottoman Sultan having formally granted them land there. This allows the Isma’ilis to be
their own elite and their own leaders not having to abide by another sect’s rules or
subjections.
Historians, reporters, politicians, and various citizens of different countries often
point to the most obvious cultural differences in the Arab world as the reason for its
troubles and downfall. Sectarianism, regionalism, tribalism, and class struggle are so often
thrown out but never analyzed. Yes, they play an incredibly imperative role in
understanding and studying Syria and their civil war. Yet, it is not as simple as just saying
those categories. A further and deeper understanding must be attained to see the
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complexities between the categories and the people that fall into them. Often the problems
arise when people fall into varying positions amongst more than one of the categories. For
example, affiliating with a certain religion that doesn’t match up with your specific tribe,
class, or sectarian views. This is where conflict arises. There are categories or divisions,
then within those there are subcategories and subdivisions, all the way down the pole until
there is a plethora of offshoots with which a single individual or group can indentify with.
When the categories overlap, it makes it “difficult to determine which play a role in a
particular situation. In the event of overlap, there is a danger of interpreting tribal loyalty
as regional and/or sectarian loyalties, for instance, or vice versa” (Van Dam). In another
instance “sectarian, regional, and tribal groups may in turn partially overlap with socioeconomic differences” (Van Dam). This causes issues because for starters a religious
community usually is made up of all socio-economic classes. On the flip side, “sectarian
loyalties can have a catalyzing influence on the take-off of a class struggle if sectarian
contrasts coincide with socio-economic differences” (Van Dam). In countries like the U.S.
this is praised to be different. Longed for to be unique and think for yourself, follow what
you believe. In the Middle East, in Syria, where ancestral and family views and beliefs are so
prided, where the categories you identify with are so highly examined, your differences can
be the deciding factor between friends or enemies, peace or violence.
As was seen previously in the analysis of the various groups and sects creating
division among Syrians as a whole, there is a strong urban-rural divergence. The religious
minorities were compact in the countryside, the most poverty-oriented area in the country
while the larger and wealthy cities were composed primarily of Sunnis. This reality makes
it nearly unattainable to separate the analysis of urban Sunnis and rural religious
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minorities when studying the many groups and differences the Syria is flooded with. Even
greater than that, “it is difficult if not impossible to isolate sectarian, regional, tribal or
socio-economic categories when they show strong overlap and apparently form an
inseparable whole” (Van Dam). This is an important keynote because it is exactly what is at
play and has been at play for the struggle for power between the Alawis, Druzes, and
Isma’ilis in Syria since 1963.

IV. FRENCH MANDATES
While Britain and France laid claim to different territories across the Middle East,
only one country looked to France as a supporting force and that was Lebanon. Syria on the
other hand despised the idea of French control or intervention in their country to even the
smallest degree. In fact, most Middle Eastern countries wanted to be independent of the
rules and laws imposed by the allies. In an attempt to re-establish Arab sentiments
throughout, Emir Feisal was sent as a representative to the Paris peace conference where
he called for reconsideration of ally presence and intervention in countries like Syria and
Palestine. Feisal argued that the decision should be up to the inhabitants themselves on
whether they wanted this European imperial help or not and should be determined by
sending a “commission of inquiry” (Mansfield). President Wilson of the United States
approved of this plan with the suggestion that the commission be made up of French,
British, Italian and American representatives. The British and French though, were
obviously opposed because it would mean the removal of their strongholds and their
power so they withdrew. Ultimately it ended up being solely Americans who carried out
the inquiry. Their findings were that the citizens of Syria and Palestine “overwhelmingly
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opposed the proposal to place them under great-power mandates” (Mansfield). These
countries, aware of their situation and current status, did recognize the need for outside
help but had requested it come from the United States or Britain, strictly not France.
Despite the findings and the suggestions made by the commission, the allies completely
ignored it. Britain and France chose to ignore it, for previously mentioned reasons, and the
United States because they were on the verge of isolationism. Though the Allies were
known as a unified front in the international arena, they internally began to battle with
each other. The British government opened up that it saw the French ambitions in Syria as
excessive (Mansfield). When the French proceeded forward with their plans to “garrison
Syria with French troops, Britain refused to agree” (Mansfield). On March 8, 1920 the
General Syrian Congress in Damascus passed a resolution declaring the independence of
Syria and Palestine. In response, the Supreme Council of the League of Nations announced
its decision on May 5, 1920 that Syria would be partitioned into the two French Mandates
of Lebanon and Syria (Mansfield). Angered by the decisions, the Arab people of Syria
begged their leader Feisal to declare war on France. He recognized their ill-equipped
military would be no match for the French so instead he gave young, brash officers the
clearance to attack French positions. In response the French demanded that they be
allowed to occupy Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and the Bekaa plain, which Feisal accepted. This
ultimately led to the French completely seizing Syria and exiling Feisal.
Now that the mandates had been approved and solidified, the first thing the French
did was to enlarge Lebanon at Syria’s expense as to make Lebanon its Middle Eastern
headquarters (Mansfield). France enacted policy that placed Francophile Maronite
Christian elements on Muslim Arab peoples. France practiced complete control over society
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in Syria suppressing any sort of behavior that went against their cultural views they were
attempting to implement. Partitioning the Ottoman Empire came with violence and
fighting, especially in Syria. It also created five new Middle Eastern states; Syria, Lebanon,
Transjordan, Iraq and Palestine, all of which were under the control of either Britain or
France. The mandates were backed and legitimized by the League of Nations and instilled
for the sake of keeping their inhabitants from being returned to their former masters as
well as a form of trust where the power was administered to the territory under
supervision (Mansfield). Many saw this as a nice way, or politically correct way, of making
these territories colonies of the British and French. The result of the French Mandates in
Syria was only a beginning glimpse of separation and division. France had split Syria up in
an attempt to rule it more easily by creating districts. These districts were as follows; “One
in the Alawite mountains in the north-east inhabited mainly by the sub-Shia Alawite sect,
one in the Jebal Druze in the south where most of the people were Druze, and one in the
rest of Syria with Damascus as the capital” (Mansfield). It is clear in understanding the
French impact on Syria why modern day Syria is so deeply divided. The French were the
first key component to turmoil and poor feelings amongst various groups. The “process of
political radicalization was initiated during the era of the French mandate, the legacy of
which was almost a guarantee of Syria’s political instability” (Fildis).
Syria having finally won its independence from France was left in disarray.
Everything the Syrians earned was not without a fight and battle. This is never a positive
way for a nation to be born as it left it on its side and unprepared for challenges that may
lay ahead after exhausting itself in determination of independence from France. As author
McHugo phrased it, “Syria had no allies and has been aptly described as a political orphan.
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In addition, Syrians now had their own state and a democracy, but that democracy was
fragile- as were the state and its sense of nationhood” (McHugo).

V. SYRIAN & EGYPTIAN UNION
Another important factor in the history of Syria as an explanation for its modern day
struggles that must be looked at is the union that took place between Syria and Egypt. The
union came as a result of the “bifurcation of power which led to a stalemate, preventing
major reforms, but also to such intense conflict that Syrian politicians sought salvation in
union with Egypt” (Hinnebusch). This merger took place officially on February 2, 1958 as a
result of the growing tensions between the west, mainly the United States, and Middle
Eastern countries like Syria. It was also an outcome of “the inability to maintain a united
state” (Olmert). This tension was on the rise and directly correlated with the growing
emphasis and relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union. As time continued on and
the Soviet Union continued to back Middle Eastern countries, specifically through
supplying them with military equipment, the United States saw a dramatic increase in
threat from the Soviet camp. In 1957 Syria had accused Turkey of massing troops on its
frontier, which Nasser responded to by sending a body of troops to Damascus to express
support (Mansfield). Old school politicians typically would have preserved a relationship
with the west but unfortunately for Syria and its growing instability, the power lay in the
hands of the Ba’ath party.
Although it seemed support of the Soviet Union was becoming more widespread,
Syria began to fear a communist takeover and so saw diversion through union with Egypt.
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When this merger became complete on February 2, 1958 the presidents of the two
countries announced the name of their new territory as the United Arab Republic. King
Saud of Syria was forced to resign when it became evident that he had plans to assassinate
Egyptian President Nasser to prevent the union of Syria and Egypt (Mansfield). King Saud’s
brother Feisal took over, as he was known for being more pro-Egyptian. Things quickly
spiraled downhill for Syria as pressure from Iraqi leader Karim Kassem was exerted in an
effort to destroy the relationship between Syria and Egypt (Mansfield). Kassem and his
organization overthrew the regime in Syria, declared a republic, and killed Feisal and his
family members. This new republic of Iraq under Kassem declared its support for Egypt
and Nasser and Nasserism became the ruling ideology in Syria.
This quickly spreading takeover of a pro-Arab community along with the
destruction of pro-western sites in the Middle East gave way to fear and activated a
response on the west’s part. The United States and Britain intervened with troops to their
last few camp locations holding on to their thread of an attachment to the Middle East.
While this was happening, Nasser was headed for a downfall in his reign. His goal, hefty and
ambitious, would ultimately fail as the vastly different states of the Middle East were too
ideologically different and religiously diverse to have pan-Arabism unite them.
Feelings between Syria and Egypt became rocky as the Syrian’s realized, though
their ideologies were similar, they were still very different. On top of this, the Ba’ath party
demanded power to rule in Syria while Nasser would have none of that under the
“umbrella rule of his authority and prestige” (Mansfield). The new political structure in
Syria was shaped after the Egyptian one and although Nasser appointed two Syrian vicepresidents and many ministers to the government, he never gave them full control as
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power always remained in his own hands. The union between the two states rapidly fell
apart for a couple of reasons. First, the Syrians began to feel that they were no longer
partners with Egypt rather being completely watched over. Second, the Syrians felt the
Egyptians didn’t hold a high energetic pro-Arab rationale as they did. Third, Syria, which
had always been built on a free economy, watched as Nasser’s socialist principles were
imposed upon them (Mansfield). Next, Syria’s agricultural sector suffered three years of
consecutive draughts between 1958 and 1960 (Mansfield). Despite his best efforts, Nasser,
like many others, failed to stabilize Syria and find a working government for its people. On
September 28, 1961 a group of Syrian army officers rebelled (Mansfield). This marked the
end of the union between the two in an effort to create a United Arab Republic. Though
Nasser let them leave, he also stated that they would always be welcome back should they
feel so inclined to rejoin.
The attempted union between two similar states shows the mess and failure that
continues to be Syria. It is so structurally and internally damaged and broken that the
diverse population and strong-sided views create a hostile environment where turmoil is
inevitable. As history continues on it is clear that with each passing event, Syria is nearly a
lost cause when even fellow Middle Eastern countries are failing at intervention in last
hopes of saving it. Civil war is clearly in the path ahead.
What became known as the Separatist Movement from 1961-1963 proved not only
to show a separation of the Sunnis and minorities, but a change of power in major political
roles as well. The Military Command was predominantly led, with most authoritative
positions being held, by Sunnis. The military had a stronghold in Damascus, which as we
know from earlier, was a major Sunni controlled city. The Syrian Army Command was
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made up of ten members, five Damascene Sunnis, four of the five others were Sunni, and
one was Druze. The Syrian Officers Corps recognized the power being held by Damascene
Sunnis, and demanded that a non-Damascene commander-in-chief be appointed. Druze
Major-General ‘Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, then fourth in seniority, accepted this position
(Van Dam). However, Sunni Damascene al-Nahlawi occupied the key military position of
deputy director of officers’ affairs, a position that allowed him to move and control officers
he wanted to units he preferred. In other words, he could set himself up to be even more
powerful by moving certain officers to positions and units that best supported him.
Unfortunately for him, he never could gain solid support amongst the non-Damascenes,
which would ultimately play a key role in the downfall of his and his fellow Damascene
officers. In a last effort to hold onto his dwindling power, he orchestrated a military coup
that failed and resulted in his and five of his greatest Damascene military colleagues
expulsion from Syria. There was a clear separation between the Damascene and nonDamascene within the military. The Homs Military Congress was to convene in an attempt
to dilute any violent actions from occurring. However, at the congress, Damascene
Lieutenant-Colonel Muti al-Samman demanded that six non-Damascene officers be
expelled from Syria in equal composition for the removal of al-Nahlawi (Van Dam). Quite
the opposite affect ended up taking place. Over the next couple of years Damascene officers
and military members were slowly purged from any sort of politically strategic position
and were replaced with, as the then Druze General Zahr al-Din put it, “officers who
harbored nothing but hatred and aversion towards Damascus and its inhabitants” (Van
Dam). The military was dwindling its numbers in Sunni and Damascene representation and
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was growing stronger and stronger with minorities, a powerful hand to hold for the
minorities, and a politically strategic one at that.
The monopolization of power by the minority groups in Syria did not stop there. It
grew even stronger in 1963 when a military coup by Ba’thists succeeded in bringing down
this “separatist regime” and instead strengthened its numbers in minorities at the expense
of the Sunnis. This was a direct result of the Ba’ath military leaders whom quickly put into
positions of power and leadership, family members and friends from their own choosing.
Most of these people called up then, were mainly Alawis, Druzes, and Isma’ilis (Van Dam).
The minorities were only picking up steam. Though they once had lived lives in the poor
countryside of Syria, they were finding themselves growing stronger as a cohesive unit,
gaining military power, and therefore political power. A role that required them to tread
lightly with their newfound power, so as not to abuse it, and not to lose it.

VI. ISRAELI & SYRIAN CONFLICT
The next important historical focal point in understanding today’s civil war in Syria
is the debate over Zionism resulting in a Syrian war with Israel. Following the end of World
War One, the peace settlement declared Palestine in 1918 a Jewish state for refugees to go
and settle. However, Palestine still consisted of strong Arab Nationalists who showed
disdain for their new neighbors and frustration and anger over the Jewish population
receiving their land. Upon asking for reconsideration or a different area to be the
designated place for Jewish refugees following the Holocaust, tensions began to rise as the
Allied powers denied their request. Ultimately, it was decided that Palestine would be split
into two new states, one that would be known as modern day Israel. Israel was to be the
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land for the Jewish population; this allowed them to carry out Zionism. Many international
leaders saw this as a resolution to the problem, but instead Palestine Arab’s grew in their
anger and hate and pulled in their own allies, which consisted of many countries that
bordered Israel, including Syria. Violent revolts began to break out and border battles and
land/territory ownership became the new topic of debate amongst the Middle East (Oren).
This is what eventually led to a battle between Israel and much of the Middle East, though
they were backed by Britain and France, and more specifically with Syria. A great portion of
discontent between Israel and Syria, which also continues today, is the struggle over the
Golan Heights. This piece of land was seen as a prime territorial control of the Syrians but
was partitioned off to the Israelis. It has since then been the topic of great discussion and
reconsideration and now even battle over with whom it should belong. This unfinished
business and inability to come to a fair and satisfying conclusion between the two countries
has pitted them against one another historically, and still today.
The Arab revolt of 1936-39 is arguably what pulled in more of the Middle East than
just Palestine. It is seen as the spreading the conflict no longer between Jews and Arabs in
Palestine rather Zionism and Arabs everywhere (Oren). On May 14 when the British
Mandate ended, the regional battle broke out against Israel. Syria and Iraq were the two
bordering nations who led the invasion. Egypt eventually joined out of fear of other Middle
Eastern states growing their territories in the process (Oren). Egypt had also signed a
mutual defense agreement with Syria in 1966. Unfortunately for them, Syria became
quickly dissatisfied with the efforts to demolish Israel and Zionism and took it upon
themselves to be the leader in doing so.
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Syrian tanks rained thirty-one shells on Kibbutz Almagor, killing one and wounding
two others by the end of the attack (Oren). This was the start of the Syrian effort to move
from the defensive to attack. Though there was no clear understanding in why the Syrians
had become so abruptly violent and determined on the matter, it is important to point out
that the Ba’ath party of the time had a strong ideological belief in the elimination of Israel,
Zionism, and imperialism (Oren). It should also be noted that another factor in Syria’s
involvement was a direct result of their current conflict with Iraq over the Iraq Petroleum
Company. Syria was up in arms over their payment received for allowing Iraqi oil to flow
over their land. Much of this newly found resentment on the topic, clearly stemmed from
the fact that the IPC was a British owned company and was therefore an imperialist
presence in the Middle East that Syria was determined to rid of. Another important catalyst
of war between Syria and Israel stemmed from the Soviet Union pressure and misleading
information upon Syria. The Soviet Union was publicly announcing that it was avoiding
conflict in the Arab Middle East, though it was actually pushing Syria to become more
active. The Soviet Union saw this as their chance to attain their longtime goal of owning key
waterways in the Middle East and isolating Turkey (Oren).
All of these reasons were key players in Syria’s move to attack Israel, but one everpresent issue in Syria was the ultimate catalyst. Syria so internally divided officers against
civilian “doctors with President al-Atassi and foreign minister Makhous, Hafez al-Assad
with support of the air force, the army pitted against President Jadid, and both generals
were opposed by Intelligence Chief Abd’ al-Karim al-Jundi (Oren). Explosions, fighting,
attempted assassinations, were all becoming part of a typical day in Syria. This internal
strife played a direct hand in the internal insecurity of the Syrian Regime leading them to
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feel a desperate desire to “out-Nasser-Nasser” (Oren). In an attempt to diffuse the
mounting tension on the borders specifically but between Israel and Syria as a whole, a
meeting or conference was held where they were asked to uphold their previously signed
agreement to refrain from acts of hostility. Both denied the agreement and eventually the
meeting came to a close with feelings more bitter than when they had arrived and less
likely to come to any sort of agreement. Syria and Israel continued attacks on each other,
and they even began to multiply on the border. Syria had begun to back Palestine in their
acts of aggression against Israel as well. It went so far that the United States recognized and
announced that the Syrians were not going to stop until war broke out. For that, the
Americans implored the Israelis to disregard their long-standing opposition to retaliations
(Oren).
War broke out in what became titled the “Six Days War”. The shortest war in
history, the Israelis battled against multiple Arab states. Shocking to many, Israel came
through victorious and with overwhelming numbers. Syria was later blamed for having
started a war in which they did not really participate fighting in. Yet, far after the war Syria
continued to denounce Israel and Zionism and yet perpetually battles itself within its own
borders. Syria strongly rejected approval of a peace treaty with Israel and openly shared its
disapproval of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Though Syria had Soviet backing and
other states at war with them, their internal strife and struggle ultimately led to their
defeat against Israel and the Allies. Syria’s greatest loss in this battle with Israel however,
rose from the loss of territory: the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights is a plateau that is
bordered by the Sea of Galilee, Hula Valley, Yarmouk River, Mount Hernon, and Wadi
Raqqad. It was originally and area considered part of Syria but was conquered by the
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Israelis during the Six Day War. The fallout between Israel and Syria has continued for
years as a result of the dispute over this piece of land. Today it has contributed to the
Syrian Civil War, as it has become a stronghold for the terrorist organization ISIS to carry
out attack across the Middle East, infiltrate refugee movements, and contribute to the
overall instability and violence in Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
requested Israel be allowed to impose Israeli law in an attempt to help oust the presence of
terrorist activity due to the fact that Syria is incapable because as the Prime Minister put it,
“Syria has disintegrated beyond the point of reunification”. His requests were denied and
ISIS and the struggle for control of the Golan Heights rages on perpetuating the instability,
violence, and strife throughout Syria.

VII. HAFIZ AL-ASAD’S RISE TO POWER
Syria’s tumultuous political and social history has led up to the point of Hafiz alAsad taking command. It is clear that with the inability to maintain stability with both
internal and external influence, the struggle for power will continue to occur. Under French
Mandate and unity with Egypt, Syria still made irrational decisions and fought against help
from anyone exactly like themselves. The country burned bridges with not only the Allies of
the west but also with fellow Middle Eastern countries as well, leaving them to fend for
themselves with bad blood surrounding them. Understanding the sectarian, regional, and
tribal divide of the country also demonstrates the lack of one cohesive unit to progress
forward in any sort of groundbreaking decision-making. Much of this stems from the ethnic
and religious differences that are seen as so great a divide, they are unable to trust their
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own fellow Syrians from various groups. These factors are all what have led us to the battle
for power between al-Asad and Salah Jadid.
Jadid’s power stemmed from his control on a large portion of the armed forces and
military through inside connections. However, on the flip side, al-Asad was minister of
defense giving him the upper hand along with his role as the Ba’thist Military Committee.
Difference of opinion in the country led to the Arab military defeat in 1967 and ultimately
to tensions rising. The two sides of the argument consisted of the ideological view of
pursuing a society based on socialist ideals or a society based on Arab nationalist policy.
Asad and Jadid represented each of these political sides at the Regional and National Ba’th
Party Congress. Jadid believed in a “socialist transformation” with greater dependence on
the Soviet Union and other Communist countries (Van Dam). This group also rejected
anything “reactionary, rightest, or pro-western” (Van Dam). Asad on the otherside believed
in an Arab nationalist leaning with focus on the struggle with Israel and defeating them
(Van Dam). Jadid dominated Asad at the congress, winning majority of the support, yet
Asad was not satisfied with this. Asad used his military connections and titles to gain
control, support, and ultimately power of the armed forces. This then forced Jadid to grip
tighter onto his civilian party apparatus. This created the biggest divide in Syria we see
today; the armed forces and the civilian apparatus of the Ba’th in Syria.
Asad made his move for control by abducting the then chief of the national security
and general intelligence services as well as a handful of Jadid’s other aides and supporters.
The confrontation between the two leaders continued to grow when in 1970 Syrian
political leaders made the decision to intervene in the Jordanian civil war, which ultimately
failed. The Tenth Extraordinary National Congress of the Ba’th Party was convened in 1970
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in an attempted effort at finding a solution to the party struggle. Al-Asad and his supporters
strategically prepared themselves for a defense attack should al-Asad be less favored than
Jadid in the conference. As was feared, Jadid held overwhelming support from those
members of the congress. Asad responded in attacks through the taking of civilian party
sections and capturing and arresting prominent leaders like Jadid from the opposite party.
Many other high political members fled the country from fear of arrest leaving Asad to
monopolize his newfound power marking the start to his new regime in November 1970,
and eventually to Asad in 1971 being named Syria’s first Alawi president (Van Dam). The
period of Sunni rule had come to an end, and the Hafiz al-Asad Regime now raged.
Under Asad’s rule, he used his position and power to suppress any sort of uprising
that may have been stirred up in anticipation to oust him. One very important example of
this was the 1982 Hama Massacre. During this massacre Syrian security forces entered the
densely populated old city of Hama in an attempt to seize weapons possibly held by
Islamist militants. The situation escalated as attack sirens raged through the night,
concerning the local residents and influencing them to attack the troops in the town. As
armed militants began to battle with the security forces in a brutal showdown, Hafiz alAsad’s brother “rushed to the area and from the heights of the nearby citadel, rained
artillery and tank fire into the town, leveling its major commercial and residential districts”
(Lawson). Hama was known for its outbreaks of challenge against the Ba’th Regime. The
1982 uprising changed perspectives as it now became known for “its massive scale, the
broad range of social forces that took part, the high degree of organization evidenced by its
leaders, and the ruthlessness with which it was crushed” (Lawson). The result was
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widespread as even moderate Islamists scaled back their activity drastically. For a decade,
the cities ruins were left to “stand as a stark warning to other dissidents” (Lawson).
To understand further Asad’s reign and the paradox behind his rise to power, we
must next take a look at the Ba’th party in general, further leading to the hate between the
Alawites and Sunnis. It became a question of discrepancy as to “how Ba’thist officers from
one minority sect, the Alawis, emerged as a seemingly dominant clique, most manifest after
1970 under Hafiz al-Asad, was explained by factors such as their disproportionate
recruitment into the army and party before 1963 and class and regional divisions among
the majority Sunni actors” (Hinnebusch). The Ba’th party was a political group originally
known as “The Party of the Arab Renaissance” (Ben-Tzur). This party was first established
in Syria in the forties as a party of the urban petit-bourgeois intelligentsia (Ben-Tzur). The
ideology of this Arab party was formulated after a doctrine from the party platform at the
first convention in 1947. The doctrine of this convention was “a blend of nationalist panArab radicalism with a moderate social programme-agrarian reform and partial
nationalization without infringing individual property rights, and with a neutralist policy
towards the global struggle between the communist and western blocs” (Ben-Tzur). This
Syrian political party has not consistently been active in Syria however. There was a period
in 1958-59 where the party had dissolved in Syria but remained alive in other Middle
Eastern countries. After three conferences in Lebanon, the Syrian Ba’th party was reestablished.

VIII. BA’TH PARTY
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In 1958 Syria and Egypt were to be unified. However, before this plan would be
carried out, Egyptian President Nasser demanded all Syrian political parties, including the
Ba’ath party, be dissolved prior to unification (Van Dam). It wasn’t until May 1962 that the
Ba’ath Party’s National Command made the decision to rebuild the party bastion that had
once existed in Syria. By this time, many of the former members of the Ba’ath party had
found new political parties to associate with. On March 8, 1963 a group of Ba’athist officers
and others seized power in Syria through a military coup. The Ba’athist military leaders
each claimed some level of new government responsibility, but there were not enough
Ba’athist civilians to cope with the extent of it all. Though Nasser had demanded the
dissolution of all political parties, some Ba’athists in Syria had secretly remained organized.
So, following the coup of 1963 these party members played a prominent role in the Syrian
civilian party apparatus thanks to their close ties with the leaders of the Ba’athist military
party organization which held actual power in Syria now (Van Dam). There had been rules
and regulations set in place to limit the party supporters, by the party themselves, or rather
a process they had to make it through to become an active member. At this point in time
though, they were so low on civilian members, participation, and support that they passed
a resolution allowing all supporters to be promoted to active members (Van Dam).
However, this was taken advantage of as many leaders of the Ba’ath Party used it to have
relatives, friends, and acquaintances added to the party without them meeting any of the
previously established restrictions and guidelines, which they might not have otherwise.
This in turn created an extensive amount of party blocs whose members were connected
not by ideological principles but rather by sectarian, regional, or tribal backgrounds (Van
Dam). This drove further division, now amongst the party itself.
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What was once division between the party members and those who were nonmembers had now grown to division among the members. It created a serious power
struggle in both the civilian and military party organization because it undermined party
discipline (Van Dam). The rival divisions within the party were not even seen as differing
for ideological reasons as many would have understood more. Factionalism was another
prominent issue amongst the Ba’ath Party, particularly during elections. One author states
that, “as a result [of the factionalism] some party members were not always free to choose
their leaders, and this in turn caused some of the most capable members to be prevented
from attaining commanding positions” (Van Dam). The corruption during elections was far
reaching. Sometimes it would be Ba’athist dominated power institutions who interfered in
elections to push their own preferred list of people and sometimes it was non-party
members who did what they could to sway the voting in the direction they desired. In one
case, there were so many irregularities observed that the Syrian Command had to call for
new elections (Van Dam).
Who makes up the military of a country, and who has influence over it, are very
important. The Syrian armed forces were strongly made up of minorities before the Ba’thist
officers took over in 1963. This influence in the army, of minorities, can be attributed to
politico-historical and socio-economic factors. One of these factors dates back to when
Syria was under French Mandate and they recruited Alawis, Druzes, Isma’ilis, Christians,
Kurds, and Circassians, while they discouraged Sunni Arab’s (Van Dam). Sunni Arab
landowning commercial families were fine with this arrangement, as they felt their sons
should not be sent for military training to defend what they saw as “French Imperial
Interests” (Van Dam). Furthermore, the majority Sunni Arab’s saw the military as a place
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for those economically and socially below them. More specifically those who could not
excel in society on their own or through education. So, they saw it as an insult to be a part
of the military. On the flip side, those minorities who struggled to make ends meet saw
joining the military as a way to boost themselves in society and make a decent living.
The Ba’th Party, which came to power in 1963, is the cornerstone of the rise of the
Syrian minorities. This political group came about through social channels that define
whom its followers are. It was a group seeking out socialist ideals, allowing all individuals
to be equal despite religious, tribal, or geographic affiliations. It supported the idea of Arab
Nationalism, though the Sunnis felt it was representing everything Arab Nationalism
wasn’t. The Ba’ath party was founded in Damascus in 1940 by Michel ‘Aflaq, a Greek
Orthodox Christian, and Salah al-Din Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, both who were teachers and
part of the middle class (Van Dam). As a result of their occupations, most of the people they
recruited and sought out to join their party were students of higher education that were
most often migrants who had come to Damascus for higher education. Though there was
not a laid out plan of action the party began to spread amongst the minorities of Syria with
no rhyme or reason. The strong showing of Druze amongst the Ba’ath party is often
attributed to the leader ‘Aflaq’a relationship with many families of the Jabal-al Duruz (Van
Dam). Many of the people who constituted the greatest areas of poverty and rural areas,
are those who were pulled to the Ba’ath party based on their socialist ideals versus those of
the cities, as mentioned before, that were made up of the wealthy or “bourgeoisie”. The
Ba’ath party took up the ideas of Arab Nationalism as well. While this angered many
Sunnis, who had been the group to most closely identify, the Ba’ath party had their own
understanding and interpretation of Arab Nationalism. To them, one did not have to full
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identify as religiously Islamic. They need only recognize that this is the culture, the
background with which they come from; it was their Arab heritage. One of the leaders and
founders of the Ba’ath party even said that Christian Arabs for example, should in no way
feel restricted from also being an Arab Nationalist (Van Dam). These views economically
with socialism being a main tool of the Ba’ath party, religiously with the acceptance of
outside religions, and the belief that these minorities could still associate with the sacred
Arab Nationalism, created great dissention among the minorities of Syria and they majority
Sunni of Syria. Not only the religious differences but also the social, economic, and
geographic differences made it incredibly difficult for the party to attract both minorities
and Sunnis. This was the start friction.
There were different branches of the Ba’ath party based on the location and city.
The Damascus branch was very small. The urban-rural differentiation and
Damascene/non-Damascene contrast was strong in this branch. Rightfully so, as Damascus
would be made up predominantly of Sunnis, the majority population, and were hesitant to
join the Ba’ath Party of predominantly minorities. The Hama Branch had very, very little
support. Located in the city of Hama, the Ba’ath party was up against a Sunni stronghold.
While the geographic difference is what created friction amongst the Ba’ath Party members
and non-members in Damascus, in Hama it was based more on the sectarian differences. In
April 1964, the strong opposition of the Ba’ath party was played out when an anti-Ba’thist
revolt occurred backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Van Dam). One could qualify the revolt
as a success based on the fact that Ba’ath Party activities came to a standstill.
The Ba’ath party had flaws of its own in its creation and coming to military power.
The leaders wanted to organize the party to be larger and a cohesive unit, but like
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elsewhere in Syria at the time, it was a battle for power even internally. In an effort to grow
the party in size and number, the leaders began recruiting more members. However, the
members were granted admission despite not meeting qualifications nor having support
for the Party’s views. Instead, membership was granted to those whom the organizations
leaders felt would keep them most protected in their positions of power. Beyond that, those
members eventually came to power and leadership roles within the organization and
began transforming it into whatever they wanted it to become, overshadowing and
minimizing those members who had risked everything for the party’s sake including their
lives. Sectarian polarization was at the forefront and paved the way for sectarian
discrimination. The sectarian discrimination began to take form on the part, shockingly, of
the minorities. The removal and dismissal of Sunni leaders in the armed forces was
shameless and brutal. So much so that main branch leaders were being dismissed such as
the leader of the National Guard and the leader of the Air Force (Van Dam). Those given
preferential treatment for the position openings tended to be Alawis, Druzes, Isma’ilis and
Christians, all minorities. The minorities in charge would strategically place those they
trusted, fellow minority members, in positions of greater importance, while Sunnis would
be placed in positions farthest away from main cities (Van Dam). The entire army
command structure and discipline were undermined by the manipulation of sectarian ties
and loyalties (Van Dam). To attain a grasp on how hostile the sectarian divisions were, a
British Consular report from the 1870’s stated, “they hate each other…Sunnis boycott the
Shi’ites…both resent the Druze…all despise the Alawites” (Olmert).
The Ba’th party has not existed without struggle, similar to Syria itself. After
agreeing to the union with Egypt, many citizens of the state denounced this union. The
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people felt so upset at the Egyptian domination over the command of the Ba’th party that a
military coup occurred on 28 September 1961, which led to the secession of Syria from
Egypt. Still unsatisfied with the performance of the Ba’th party, many peasants as well as
intellects considered rejoining Egypt as well as carrying out a series of attempted coups in
1962. The fifth Ba’th conference in Lebanon “advocated an all-embracing Arab union ‘on a
new basis but with due regard to the mistakes of the former one’; it was to be a federative
union under collective leadership” (Ben-Tzur). This new Ba’th party was recreated four
years after the dissolution and in less than a year it had regained control of the country
through a military coup and had unidentified itself with the old party who had agreed to
the union with Egypt.
After years of struggle within the Ba’th party and shifting of power, a new ideology
was formed. The “theoretical confusion and ideological backwardness in the party was felt
even more keenly in view of the ideological developments in the other revolutionary
regimes of the Arab world, which tended to emphasize the social commitments of the
national revolution, and of the developments in the communist world which tended to
emphasize the national character of the tasks along the route to socialism” (Ben-Tzur). The
change in power as well as the structural and ideological framework proposed by the old
party leadership, the military group, the regionalists or the careerists, were never
supported in a unifying manner within the party. What then formed was the neo-Ba’th
party of Syria based on “scientific-socialist ingredients and the militancy of the ideology”
(Ben-Tzur). This ultimately under the influence and creation by Al-Hafiz became known as
“Arab Socialism”.
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This strong Arab party poses a paradox though, as a poor Alawite man took over
control and power. Hafiz al-Assad came from one of the previously mentioned poor Alawi
families in the countryside. The paradox that is presented is how a minority group and man
could come to power in a majority and Arab political party, vastly different from what each
other believed. To understand, it is worth noting and analyzing the Alawi group in detail.
Alawism was made into a separate branch of religion from Shi’i Islam. Whereby
Muslims faithful saying is “there is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet”, Alawis
believe “There is not deity by Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman” (Pipes).
The Alawis therefore reject Islam’s main tenets, forcing them to be considered nonMuslims (Pipes). The far greatest parallel to the beliefs and traditions of the Alawis is
Christianity. For these reasons, “many observers-missionaries especially-have suspected
the Alawis of a secret Christian proclivity” (Pipes). Though women in the Alawi religion are
treated “abominably” they experience far greater freedom than the veiled Muslim women
(Pipes). Alawis do in fact reject Islam’s sacred law of Shari’a. The hate of the Sunnis stems
from the strong religious diversions, especially in the sense that Sunnis were considered
the upper class of Syria and the Alawis considered of the lower minority similar to those of
Christianity. Therefore, “Alawis do not act like Sunni Muslims; rather, they resemble
Christians and Jews in pursuing a wholly distinct way of life” (Pipes). Given that the
Alawites are whom ultimately take control of the government and power through Hafiz alAsad, it is reasonable to understand that the change in socioeconomic role and religious
deviation spur the Sunni hatred towards the minority Alawites. This understanding then
begins to explain the paradox between the rise to power of an Alawite through a pan-Arab
party.
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It should be noted that since the French Mandates, the Alawites and Sunnis have
cultivated a deep internal hate for one another. The Alawites benefited from the mandate
more than any other minority group. The Alawites “gained political autonomy and escaped
Sunni control” (Fildis). The French even created an Alawite state known as the “state of
Latakia”, as well as were bestowed legal autonomy from the French. The French
strongholds and imperial influence in Syria did not stop there in cultivating this deep rift
between Sunnis and Alawites. Another “major instrument of the French influence on the
Alawites was their recruitment into the Troupes Speciales du Levant, a local military force
formed in 1921 and alter developed into the Syrian and Lebanese armed forces” (Fildis).
The French control of the army allowed them to divide the troops according to group so as
to maintain a low level of each, preventing any one of them from becoming so powerful that
they could oust the French administration and presence in Syria. The French hand picked
and designed the Syrian Army along strong rural and minority representation. The French
considered Alawites a reliable and trustworthy minority and so maintained a branch
serving under to local French officers. The purpose of the French army in aiming to pad the
military with rural minorities was “because they were far from urban-dominant political
ideology, Arab nationalism” (Fildis). They further attempted to weaken the Arab Sunnis,
the one group capable of overturning French Syria. It is clear in the understanding of the
French influence on the Syrian army that an increased spark of distrust was implemented
between the Sunnis and the Alawites. The Alawites, strongly favored by the French, were
given far more opportunities and power than were the majority Sunnis. In addition, the
French use of mandates and imperial invasion took control over the Syrian army, molding

39

Baltes
it to their exact standards and preferences so to appease those they supported and
minimize the presence of those groups they disliked.
Pan-Arabism and the fundamental beliefs and values held by the Ba’th party were
far from relatable to the Alawites. As was previously mentioned, the pan-Arab view was
held by socially, economically, and financially well-established Sunnis in Syria. It is
interesting therefore that the people would elect and then support for so long a poor
minority Alawite man, religiously believing in everything nearly opposite that of those in
support of pan-Arabism. This continued to anger many Sunnis pitting them further against
the Alawite peoples, yet the continuity that Asad put in place and the relative stability that
he maintained were enough to earn him the backing of even those Ba’th party members
who were religiously or culturally different from himself.
Asad was the first leader to hold onto the reins of power in Syria for an extended
period of time. It is argued that Asad’s regime in Syria acts in a system of three interlocking
orbits- Alawi, Syrian and Arab (Zisser). The Alawi orbit would be the internal core; the
Syrian orbit would be the outer shell and the Arab orbit would be its soul supporting the
authority (Zisser). The Syrian regime, composed of these pertinent levels, had become a
personally controlled regime through the succession of roles within the Asad family and
Asad’s tribal affiliations. Asad mirrored his regime structure and functioning to that of the
Soviet Union looking up to communist regime rulers like Nicolae Ceausescu and Kim Il
Sung. Syria’s regime had now become the product of the Alawi’s rise from “humble status of
a minority to pre-eminence” (Zisser). Asad’s regime depended on the sectarian support of
the Alawis. Asad’s regime was also deeply rooted in the Syrian component that stemmed
from the Ba’ath revolution in 1963 and the neo-Ba’th revolution of 1966, which drove
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home the resulting socio-economic and political order of Syria. Alawi dominance and the
Asad regime grew in strength and support at the time as the other minority groups
including the Christians, Druze, and Ismaili backed it in an effort to preserve their own
security. Asad rules as a dictator appointing people closest to him to the highest most
powerful and authoritative positions. Like most dictators, he does what needs to be done
first and foremost to maintain his leadership role. It can be argued that the two strongholds
that not only placed Asad in a position of power but also kept him there are his military
connection with the army and the Ba’th party which attracted members of prominent social
circles (Zisser). Overall, the large minority number in Syria, as long as they remain in
support of Asad and his regime, any sort of uprising like was seen with the Islamic Revolt of
1976-82, will be crushed.
So why then, despite his communist, dictatorial, oppressive ways, was Asad
successful? One answer argues that he gave the constituents answers to some degree while
giving them a government and society to participate and belong (Zisser). Finally, the Arab
orbit. Though Asad was young, inexperienced, and lacked confidence, his strong ideological
ties to Arabism is what provided him and his regime legitimacy in not only the eyes of his
fellow Syrian people, but the international arena and world as a whole. In regards to his
repressive regime success and ability to hold onto power for so long and within his family,
Asad had created two armies. Of the two armies, “one was made up of praetorian guard
units recruited from his kin and sect that defended the regime, the other the professional
army that defended the country’s borders” (Hinnebusch). Further more, Hafiz al-Assad’s
ability to create further legitimacy in his regime stemmed from his ability to identify what
one author named Dawish pointed out as party, army, bureaucracy, secret police
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(Hinnebusch). These “pillars of power” are what a dominant presidency rested on and
allowed the leader’s subordination of and balancing above these institutions as a solution
to instability (Hinnebusch). What further legitimized the Asad regime was his ability to
turn Syria from a losing player to a successful player in the disputes with Israel. This
change in growth and power allowed him to “promote a hegemonic nationalist discourse
and turn Syria into a key regional power in struggles” (Hinnebusch).
Asad’s regime can be viewed as having two main components structurally. First
there was the formal system of government. This side included an executive and
legislature. The formal structure had roots in the Syrian Constitution and the Ba’th party.
Equally as important is the informal system of government that contains “the heads of the
security services and senior military commanders” (Zisser). This side of the governmental
structure is expected to “ensure stability in the state and protect it” (Zisser). The party and
the civilian government constitute the formal structural component though the party takes
priority in society and politics. The head of the party is known as the Party’s SecretaryGeneral and is held and maintained by Hafiz al-Asad. The Syrian Elite under Asad was made
up of people from his own family, the Alawi barons, and member of the Sunni community in
support of his future state (Zisser). Although there is a strongly personal and sectarian
nature to the Syrian Regime created by Asad, he has gained respect and support within the
borders of Syrian and beyond in the Middle East due to his political and social ability to
establish a functioning state and then maintain it far longer than any other attempted
leader or organization.
Asad’s legacy and regime did not come without trials. When the Soviet Union
appointed a new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, Syria saw this as an opportunity to
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increase their relations and friendship with the communist country. In the meantime, they
had their sites first and foremost on defeating Israel. They were also dedicated to ridding
the Middle East of Zionism especially in Lebanon, “an Arab rejectionist front against the
Israeli-Egyptian-American axis was now established” (Zisser), and the Islamic Revolt had
been squashed. As Syria’s confidence and strength grew, they began to invest financially in
improving their military and weaponries. The spending however, was not limited. They
began to incur large debts as they plunged deeper and deeper into unnecessary security
purchases. The focus on security caused neglect in other realms of Syrian society such as
health, education, and waters supply, leading to a failing society overall (Zisser). The result
of these poor financial expenditures; an economic crisis in 1985 that in turn led to the
beginning of anti-regime sentiment and criticism (Zisser). Syria grew more and more
erratic leading to further fallout with the west, specifically the United States. So much so
that the United States refused to have Asad to Washington for high-level meetings with the
President. Syria full of anti-American sentiment paired with the American support of Israel
continued to create a rocky path between the two polar opposite countries. Asad also
played a direct role in his declining position of power within the regime as corruption
became apparent and brought to the forefront. It I argued that while the economy and his
people struggled to survive financially he was making decisions and acting in ways to
improve the financial positions of those closest to him, and already well-off. This
corruption was just another factor inhibiting the growth and progression of Syrian society
and government

IX. BASHAR AL-ASAD’S RISE TO POWER
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Upon Asad’s death, and Basil’s, Bashar al-Asad took power at just age 34. He was
studying to be an eye doctor in London when he was called home after the death of his
brother (McHugo). In his inaugural speech, Bashar not only praised his father for his
achievements, but he also criticized failed Syrian institutions and government policy
(McHugo). Furthermore he touched on the popular topic of regaining the Golan Heights in
exchange for peace with Israel. He called for less corruption, more transparency.
Surprisingly, and important in later understanding, Bashar discussed democracy. He spoke
about it with reverence and respect with the possibility of a similar goal for Syria. Though
he acknowledge what a difficult task this would be, using time and talk as a possible excuse
should the people not support democratic reforms. The Damascus Spring came out of these
discussions but was quickly crushed with great opposition and a fear of the loss of power
for Bashar. It did not take long for word to spread that the political freedom of the
Damascus Spring was actually just “a public relations exercise by the authorities and little
more” (McHugo).
The rise to power by Bashar al-Asad was a succession many Syrians feared could
overthrow their newly found stability under Hafiz, once he passed. It was unknown
whether “opposition would mobilize once the feared strongman departed or the regime
even disintegrate in internecine struggle” (Hinnebusch). However, the transfer of power
was rather smooth and successful. This could potentially be attributed to the fact that
Bashar represented to the people’s desire for both continuity and change through his
ability to continue what his father had started and done while still being considered a
modernizer, helping him earn support from the younger generations. It may appear to the
outside eye that this is a reflection of the successful institutions that had been instilled in
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the once unstable country, but according to author Lesch, it shows rather that “the elites
came together in a consensus” (Hinnebusch). Within three years of coming to power
Bashar had reinvented to political elite, “with a turnover of 60% in top offices, via
retirement, thereby transferring power to a new generation” (Hinnebusch). Perhaps part of
Bashar al-Asad’s crumble from power in the eyes of the people began when he began to
move his ideologies and reforms away from Ba’thist views and chose a more liberalizing
strategy. However, while he made this risky modification, he had no plan or preparation
with where he would go with it and therefore had to make sure his changes were gradual,
avoiding any sort of backlash and instability. Politically, Perthes argues that “Bashar’s
project can be understood as ‘modernizing authoritarianism’, making the system work
better so that it could survive and deliver development” (Hinnebusch). Bashar made the
acknowledgement that the Syrian society was not in a place to instill a western democracy.
His goals were first and foremost aimed at social and economic modernization and then
followed with democratization.
To understand the role that Bashar al-Asad was placed in, one must reflect on the
major historical events that have led to this point. The British and French partitioning of
Syria, acquisition of complete Syrian independence, unity and fallout with Egypt, constant
battle and turmoil with Israel as a result of the partitioning of Palestine, all of these factors
on top of his own father’s imprint on Syria (both good and bad), are components of the
society and culture with which Bashar has authoritatively inherited. What he can do with
that will not only be a challenge but a test.
On September 11, 2001 Osama bin Laden’s terrorist suicide team crashed airliners
into the U.S. World Trade Centers. This marked further Middle Eastern involvement by the
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U.S. in a more direct way than ever before as President Bush declared “war on terror”. The
terrorist group that had carried out the attacks was known as Islamist militants of al-Qaida.
Syria saw this as an opportunity to amend relations with the western country and so used
their intelligence services to provide information to the American government. However,
Syria could not definitively commit to being “with” the United States in their Middle
Eastern battles (McHugo). Syria opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 because Iraq was
a main source of income for the country. While other countries decreased their trade and
relations with Iraq per support of the U.S. Syria failed to do so (McHugo). As American
troops began to line the borders of Syria, and Damascus became a center for fleeing
citizens, Syria began to question if they were next on the American radar. Syria made the
poor decision of allowing terrorist infiltration across its borders, leading the U.S. to identify
them as terrorist sponsors, and ultimately further damaging what little progress had been
made between the two. In addition, it was as if Syria saw their relations with the west and
the U.S. as irredeemable because they chose to align themselves and ally with the terrorist
group Hezbollah. Hezbollah incessantly attacked Israel further creating a disparity between
the pro-Arab country of Syria and the pro-western country of America. What little glimpse
of possible positive change in Syrian government was felt in Bashar’s inaugural speech was
now wiped clean, as it was clear he would follow in his father’s footsteps. As he became
more corrupt by power and wealth, though he had many followers and supporters of
various sects throughout the country, Bashar was rapidly increasing the gap between the
wealthy and the poor (McHugo). When Bashar al-Asad’s economic reforms began to
dwindle and become less successful, he looked elsewhere to continue the legitimization of
his regime and “adopted a hard line toward Israel amidst the al-Aqsa intifadah and opposed
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the U.S. invasion of Iraq; this, in arousing intense American hostility, soured the
international environment for his economic reforms” (Hinnebusch). The Damascus Spring,
a liberalization measure that was seen as positive in regards to Bashar’s regime, were then
tarnished when he “reasserted the authority of the old regime, including a crackdown in
2001 on political discussion groups and the imprisonment of prodemocracy militants” (St
John). Bashar al-Asad had quickly begun to lose support and was now spiraling downward.
He continued to nose dive as he opened to Iraq, and supported the Palestinian intifada as
was previously mentioned. Furthermore, his inability to make peace with Israel prevents
Syria from forming a positive relationship between Syria and the United States. In the
process, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S. occupation of Iraq, and concerns that the war
on terrorism could target Syria all reinforce the intransigence of the old guard in Syrian
politics and become a pretext for obstructing change in both external and internal policies”
(St John). As the citizen’s discontent grew over the lack of change, a major movement in the
Middle East sparked the first outcry to be heard and demand change. Bashar al-Asad
believed Syria was too stable to have an uprising under his watch and control, perhaps that
is why he responded with such brutality when the Arab Spring spread to Syria.

X. THE ARAB SPRING
The Arab Spring was a democratic uprising that started in Tunisia and spread
among a group of Middle Eastern countries. The Arab Spring was a result of frustration and
failure throughout the Middle East. The Arab Spring was born out of a “broad set of ideas
and grievances that are motivating” change (Jones). As Jones states, “the Arab world
underperforms all other regions of the world on virtually all social, political, and economic
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indices, and has done for many years” (Jones). Jones then identified three important factors
that would increase the likelihood of the Arab Spring spreading to specific countries and
destabilizing them. Jones identifies these three factors as poverty, lack of economic
opportunity, and a repressive and disliked regime. Chillingly, these three things throughout
this paper have all been proven to be present in Syria. In addition, the technological and
social innovations fo modern times has given the “underemployed, educated, and
frustrated urban youth the ability to communicate in real time and to organize themselves
via social media, revolutionalizing the collective imagination of what is possible” (Jones).
Ultimately, one of the main factors of the Arab Spring and general instability in the Middle
East as a whole, and Syria specifically, comes from the inability for leaders and regimes to
establish legitimacy.
Author McHugo states that “what they wanted was human rights, democracy and
jobs: three demands which they summed up with the one word ‘dignity’” (McHugo). The
Arab Spring first spread to places like Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen before finally
reaching Syria. This outbreak of democratic cries was the event that finally broke Syria into
a civil war, something it had been on the verge of for nearly its whole history. Perhaps it
can be argued that it was avoidable had violence not been seen as the solution by the
regime. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and it was rather inevitable. It all started in Syria
in a southern town called Der’a where a group of young school children had begun writing
“freedom” and a slogan calling for the fall of the regime, as graffiti on their school walls.
This most likely came from influence both within their own households of hearing their
parent’s voiced opinions as well as in society and the media learning about the other Arab
countries who had carried out similar events. The children, ranging in age from 9-15, were
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arrested and taken to Damascus for interrogation and torture (McHugo). After pleas for
release by the families were ignored, demonstration broke out calling for the children’s
release in Der’a. The security forces showed their insensitivity to brutality when they shot
four people dead at these demonstrations. This only fueled the demonstrators and the
people of Syria, increasing the protestor turnout. Dar’a’s involvement quickly became “a
rallying cry across the country for what began as a rural and provincial driven uprising”
(CNN). The protestors began attacking government offices and buildings and the security
forces began attacking hospitals and innocents’ as well as local Ba’th party headquarters.
On 23 March, the security forces raided a mosque which had become a temporary hospital
to treat those now being injured in the ongoing disturbances and on this day, 15 people
were reported killed and hundreds injured (McHugo). In an attempt to preserve his
authority and power, Bashar blamed it all on a foreign conspiracy (McHugo). He further
claimed that “stability in Syria depended on its [his regime] staying in power” (Olmert). Yet,
the government brutality against protestors did not let up and the battle between Syrian
citizens and the Syrian government had escalated into all out chaos and civil war. It quickly
spiraled into a more sectarian battle as it became evident that Bashar al-Asad’s regime,
Alawite, had committed the atrocious massacres.

XI. ANALYSIS RESULTS
Today it is highly debated what has led to the gruesome outbreak of violence and
civil war in the Middle East as a whole and Syria specifically. One country believes and
argues it is the colonial and imperial mock rule that took place by western states
historically. As a result Syria has never been able to rid itself of hostile feelings from
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unwanted intervention. Others argue that it is a result of the bad blood from the Six Days
War between Syria and Israel because Israel was ultimately a “friend” of the U.S, increasing
anti-western views in an already strongly pro-Arab region and country. The most popularly
argued reason for the Syrian struggles and war are the sectarian differences and vast
variety of differing groups. The latter is the most common choice of blame from the United
States. Yet still the argument stems to socioeconomic divergence.
What these western and European countries on the outside looking in often
misunderstand, is that the Syrian Civil War is not the result of one pointed finger. Meaning,
the Syria we see and experience today is a Syria shaped and molded by all of these
influences and factors deeply rooted in historical significance. The French Mandates,
French and British intervention, Israeli-Syrian War, Syrian-Egyptian unity, and sectarian
divides all play a role in the instability in both Syrian society and government. They have
built on top of each other, one influencing the other, intertwining themselves as intricately
as the history they reside in. The inability of a leader or group to maintain power and
create an environment suitable for progression has led to short-lived terms of power and
extensive handoffs of authority between many different people. These components laid the
groundwork for what is more modernly the Asad Regime. A leader who provided some
degree of continuity for a period of time could be considered the most successful Syrian
ruler, securing the position of power to remain in his family. As successors have risen up,
they inevitably follow suit in their ideologies and political policies, leading them to never
quite impact Syria positively on a long-term scale, nor make the changes or differences
necessary to society and government as a whole.
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The Asad Regime was merely a sheet of hope cast over a land of deeply rooted,
extensive issues. These issues have never truly been addressed in a legitimate way of
finding a solution, rather a façade to alleviate the here and now. Literature emphasizes the
goals of most leaders, especially those based on dictatorial ideologies, tend to have one goal
on their mind; power. More importantly, their one goal is maintaining that power. The Asad
family is no different. They have done what they can and want to insure their roles,
finances, and power never escape their grasp. As a result, the underlying historical tensions
have always managed to find a way to rise back up, sending Syria spiraling back down into
its quick sand of a broken societal system. The civil war, is not only product of these
unsolved broken linkages, but is also the current state of failure we are experiencing in
modern Syria today.
Syria’s strength in ideology contributes to a level of stubbornness in fixing its issues.
Unfortunately the image of outside help has been so tainted by past interactions that Syria
will not even consider the idea of peaceful intervention by another state. The first topic that
should be addressed is Syria and its international relations. Upon improvement in this
realm, Syria could potentially be more open to assistance and aid from the countries it so
deeply loathes, but could help. For example mending their relationship with the United
States would not only help this direct relationship but would also require the coming to a
joint agreement on the topic of Israel, thereby finding a solution to two prominent
impactful events that had once shaped them in negative ways, potentially paving the way
for a now positive outcome. Support from a country like the U.S. would allow Syria to
receive foreign aid, but would also improve their overall image internationally. The United
States is trusted and well-liked as are their friends and allies. Many countries right now
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fear attaching themselves in anyway to Syria so some sort of peaceful negotiations and
approvals could immediately improve their situation.
Though history can never be forgotten, and should never be forgotten, Syria’s best
interests lie in a third-party intervention. Starting there, getting the country on its feet, and
mentoring them to a place promoting progression is a strong and aggressive way to
“attack” the issues in Syria. As long as they continue to rage on, the problems grow and
begin to spread beyond the borders of this Middle Eastern country as was previously
mentioned as a consequence in many aspects. Outside assistance may also be able to
implement a more successful and flourishing economic program. As another one of the
downfalls in Syria, the wealthy to poor economic gap (and growing), stabilizing the
economy through means other than a socialist system, as was had in the past, would mean
decreasing this disparity. However this tactic presents a challenge of its own. Syria has
alluded to “involving Israel in a full-scaled war if attacked either by the United States,
NATP, or Turkey” (Olmert). Incapable of attacking Israel in an impactful way, it is more the
Syrian ally Hezbollah, and the means to attain chemical warheads, that the U.S. is skeptical
about upsetting.

XII. CONSEQUENCES
The impact of the Syrian civil war has been widespread. It has shaken the state of
Lebanon, a religiously diverse nation that is on the brink of its own imbalance in its
sectarian divisions as well as those who support and oppose President Bashar al-Asad.
Much of this stems from the bordering country and Syria and its civil war, offshooting and
effecting countries like Lebanon. To many researchers surprise though, the effects it has
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had on Lebanon are less negative than other surrounding countries. The merchandise
imports and exports as well as service exports had remained rather stable during the civil
war. The loss of Syrian goods to compete in the market has opened further avenues for
Lebanon to take advantage of and financially boost their own economy.
Stemming from the economic impact is the question of regional resources such as
oil. Simply, prices will fluctuate due to uncertainty, but is that all? Regional unrest and
major events, such as the Arab Spring, could potentially cause oil prices to skyrocket. While
the Gulf States tend to be more stable and can work to stabilize oil prices long term, there is
still the possibility of sporadic short term sharp increases in the price of oil as the Middle
East is the oil capital of the world.
Another consequence of the Syrian civil war is the economic downturn of Syria.
Syria, not the strongest trading nation in the Middle East, has created such bad blood
between not only themselves but also fellow Middle Eastern countries and especially
western countries. This has caused many nations to restrict trade with Syria or cut trade
ties off altogether. In terms of domestic economy the civil war has destroyed infrastructure,
prevented children from going to school, closed factories, and deterred overall investments
and trade (Cal). Citizens are facing high levels of unemployment at 57 percent, while in
2013 Syria’s GDP dropped a staggering 20.6 percent, and in 2014 the economy was so
disrupted no formula could even produce accurate statistics (Global Envision). According
to the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Syrian HDI has fallen back to where it
was 38 years ago, meaning that today the average Syrian has the same life expectancy,
education and employment prospects as in 1977 (Global Envision). In a look at the future, if
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the war were to end, the United Nations anticipates the damage will be similar to some
nations after WWII, taking 40-50 years to fully recover (Global Envision).
Syrian expert Josef Olmert also emphasizes the demographic changes, which are to
be expected as a consequence of the Syrian civil war. In Lebanon, “their civil war and
aftermath brought about two very distinct changes, the first was the dramatic weakening of
the Christian population of the country, mostly the Maronites, but also other Christian
sects, and the second, was the brain drain, as many who left belonged to the more educated
and skilled elements of the population” (Olmert). He goes on to further claim this can be the
demographic outcome we should expect to, sadly, see in Syria. The violence in Syria has
also shifted towards an ethno-sectarian battle, which has prompted, the Kurdish
community to mobilize to protect itself (Lawson). The “ethno-sectarianization of the civil
war, along with the political mobilization of almost all of Syria’s minority communities, has
prompted members of these ethnic and religious minorities who reside in neighboring
countries to intervene directly in the conflict” (Lawson). The greatest of these types of
involvement came through the Lebanese Shi’I movement the Party of God, known more
typically as Hezbollah. This is where we begin to see the most tragic consequence of the
Syrian civil war, refugee movements. Much of the refugee movement has dramatically
increased in numbers recently, as the instability that has been further perpetuated by the
civil war has opened the door for terrorists to locate and create a stronghold in the country.
One of these terrorist organizations whom are active in Syria is ISIS.
One of the most tragic consequences is the refugee movement from Syria to nearby
Middle Eastern countries in an effort to attain peace, security, and an overall better quality
of life. What was once less than 58,000 “asylum seekers” in April of 2015 has dramatically
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risen to close to 89,000 in June (Heisbourg). In June there was nearly 190,000 Syrian
refugees. From January to September 2015, 75% of refugees were seeking shelter in Greece
from Turkey (Heisbourg) and 70% of these were nearly all Syrian. This mass exodus of
people has consequences however, for the countries that are a part of the EU they are
arriving in. Not only does it create tensions, overcrowding, loss of jobs for current citizens,
and drain finances to sustain the abruptly spiked population numbers etc. But it also brings
a security dynamic to play, especially as it becomes more evident that these refugee groups
are now being infiltrated by terrorist groups such as ISIS, seeking to use them as a tactic to
employ terrorist activity in the open countries. Overall the ability to house and protect the
displaced migrants in the new countries is straining these countries because of limited
numbers of resources. This displacement is “causing an enormous humanitarian crisis with
implications for host countries, international aid agencies, and, of course, for those whose
lives have been forever changed” (Kirisci & Ferris). The civil war in Syria has also had the
effect of forcing neighboring countries’ leaders in the Middle East to either back Bashar alAsad or the Syrian opposition, what they choose can potentially have to power to create
more instability and international hostility in an already fragile region.
The continued violence and civil war in Syria, which appears to have no imminent
end, provides “no prospect for their early return home” (Heisbourg). As refugees are
increasing, more and more countries are also choosing to close their doors for a multitude
of various reasons. It was stated by Slovakian leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski that, “In Slovakia,
we don’t have mosques, we only want to choose the Christians” (Heisbourg). Many regional
concerns have shifted in just a few short years. One main regional concern regarding the
Syrian civil war outbreak would be to “avoid large-scale refugee flows” (Heisbourg). A
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second important topic worth addressing to many regional countries would be the
elimination of ISIS as well as providing the non-Jihadi component of the Syrian rebellion
with the ability to resist Russian and Iranian operations in support of Asad while still
pursuing his removal through political measures (Heisbourg). Most literature on the topic
of refugee movements asserts it as a consequence of civil war. It is interesting to note that it
has also been argued to be a possible cause of civil war. One article on international
organizations notes, “that international migration in general, and refugee migration in
particular, can have important security consequences, which suggests that refugee flows
and population movements can spur the spread of conflict both between and within state”
(Salehyan & Gleditsch).

XIII. CONCLUSION
It is easy to fall victim to the belief that the solution to the Syrian Civil War is simple
and straightforward. It is easy to believe fixing one minor detail will put the country as a
whole back on its feet. The Syrian Civil War is a result of more than just corruption and
sectarian division as is most regularly depicted in western politics. It is the product of a
long line of historical events that started by implanting a seed, and continued to grow on
each other, each one stirring up bad feelings. The Syrian Civil War is an outbreak of internal
violence based on the historical events of French and British colonial rule, French
mandates, Israeli-Syrian war, Egyptian and Syrian unification, sectarian divisions, and the
Asad Regime. All of these factors created an environment of political distrust, instability,
turmoil, chaos, and ultimately violence as we now see today. More simply put, it is the
product of a conglomerate of historical imperfections. Although there are many
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consequences of the civil war, some that have yet to even occur, one of the most tragic is
the refugee movement the world is experiencing today. Now raised as a moral, ethical, and
civil issue, the refugee movement has become a source of great debate and discomfort in
the international arena. The question of what is right and what is wrong is at the forefront
as many countries intervene to do what they can, but even more stay quiet in avoidance. As
the world continues to search for a solution, I believe the answer lies in the understanding
that the civil war is the result of not just one individual event, as is often argued
internationally, but rather a conglomerate of deeply intertwined historical moments.
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